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Introduction
T HE ADVENT of satellite communications made possible for the
first time the worldwide relay of word and image.' Advances in
technology now bring broadcast of satellite close to practical realiza-
tion, with predictions of the availability of operational systems within
the forthcoming decade.2 Direct satellite broadcasts are already being
conducted on an experimental basis in both the United States and
Canada in tele-education, tele-medicine, community interaction, and
data communications.3 This method of communication is potentially
useful for both domestic and international purposes.
The possibility of direct satellite broadcasting has impelled the
members of the United Nations to demand a set of binding principles
governing the use of this new technology, with particular emphasis
1. See, e.g., Note, The Communications Satellite Corporation: Toward a Workable
Telecommunication Policy. 27 HASTINGs L. J. 72 (1976). Three systems were successive-
ly put into operation: "point-to-point" telecommunications, "distribution" satellites and
"direct broadcast" satellites. In the point-to-point telecommunications system the signal
is transmitted by a relatively low-power satellite to powerful and sensitive receiving
earth stations. These transmit/receive earth stations are connected to the terrestrial tele-
communications networks, which relay the televised signal in the same way as any other
television broadcast to the transmitting stations which broadcast it to individual re-
ceivers. In the distribution satellite system satellites transmit the signal directly to ground
relay stations, which distribute it to individual receivers in the same way as conventional
land-based transmissions. Direct broadcast satellites involve a system in which signals
transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by in-
dividual or community receivers. Barrow and Manelli, Communications Technology -
A Forecast of Change (pts. I - II), 34 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 205, 431 (1969).
2. 29 U.N. CAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 6 Annexes,
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC, 105/127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CPUOS, Annex 6].
3. Interview with Steve Doyle, NASA Assistant Administrator for International
Affairs; Deputy Assistant Administration, in Washington D.C. (Aug. 6, 1976) [herein-
after cited as Doyle Interview]. NASA Press Release No. 75-316 19-22 (American ex-
periments), 23-31 (Canadian experiments) (Jan. 11, 1976) [hereinafter cited as NASA
Press Release - 1976].
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on the right of recipient States to control what their people receive.
Since 1972 the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (CPUOS) has been drafting a set of principles which
might lead to an acceptable international agreement. A Legal Sub-
committee and a Working Group has been created to aid the CPUOS
in this task.4
This note will examine the implications for both domestic and in-
ternational law which arise from the draft agreement currently before
the CPUOS Legal Subcommittee. Part I will provide the reader with
a general background in the technology of direct broadcasting satel-
lites. Part II will trace the history of the United Nations' efforts to deal
with this new technology. The second section will also identify the
legal and political issues of international concern, with particular at-
tention to the issues of prior consent, and of control over program
content, the two most crucial and sensitive of those debated at the
United Nations. Part III will analyze existing international law as it
applies to the issues raised by direct television broadcasting by satel-
lites. Finally, Part IV will discuss the domestic constitutional problems
which could arise from a draft agreement which would require the
United States to restrict international transmissions by its broadcasters.
PART I. TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Benefits of the New Technology
There is a general .agreement that the direct broadcast satellite
promises great benefits to mankind.; Many remote areas of the world
which cannot be reached with existing communications systems will
be able to receive programs of cultural, economic, and educational im-
portance." This is particularly true for developing countries where
4. The Legal Subcommittee has been assigned the task of drafting a statement of
these principles. The draft will then be submitted to the CPUOS for endorsement, which
in turn will submit it to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption. The General
Assembly then will decide whether to adopt these principles in the form of a declara-
tion or a resolution open for ratifications as a treaty. For the purpose of this note, it
is assumed that the elaboration of these principles will become a part of a treaty on
direct broadcasting from satellites.
5. The Working Group in the CPUOS expressed the view that: "technological de-
velopments in the field of satellite broadcasting hold the promise of unprecedented
progress in communications and the promotion of understanding between peoples and
cultures, and has emphasized its belief that broadcasting from satellite could make an
effective contribution toward meeting the particular needs and interests of the develop-
ing countries. 29 U.N. CAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 1 An-
nexes, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/127 (1974).
6. NASA Press Release-1976, supra note 3, at 6.
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limited facilities for conventional television broadcasting are often
confined to their largest cities. For such countries, construction of a
truly national television system by means of land-based relay and in-
terconnection facilities is often economically unfeasible.7 The satellite
can substantially reduce the overall cost of constructing a national
television system by spanning long distances, by serving where terrain
makes construction of conventional facilities difficult, and by operating
in areas where the population is widely diffused.8 Such a system would
still be costly,o but satellite might at least bring it within the realm
of economic possibility for those countries, particularly if there is
financial and technical assistance from the developed world.
TECHNOLOGY
In order to assess the significance of the information control prob-
lems which some countries anticipate in connection with direct satellite
broadcasting, it is important to distinguish broadcasting satellite serv-
ices for community reception and those for individual reception. A
general broadcasting satellite service is defined by the Radio Regula-
tion of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) as, "a
radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmit-
ted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general
public."' 0 However, a footnote to the ITU definition divides the pos-
sible types of "direct reception" into two parts: individual reception
and community reception." "Individual reception" refers to the recep-
tion of satellite transmissions by simple domestic installations with
7. See Janky, Lot-Cost Receivers and the Use of Direct Broadcast Satellites for
Instructional Television, 5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 138 (1970). Hupe, Cost Efectiveness
of an Interactive Broadcast Satellite, 13 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS 63 (1975);
Hupe, Markets for a "Social Services Satellite," 13 ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS 62
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hupe].
8. In India, where conditions of this sort exist, a very successful experiment has
just been made using NASA's ATS-1, ATS-3, and ATS-6 satellites. In a joint effort by
NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), the ATS-6 satellite, the
first satellite capable of broadcasting directly into small receivers, was used by the In-
dian government to relay television programs to some 5,000 villages and cities in seven
states. These programs were produced by India, and stressed improved agricultural
techniques, family planning and hygiene, school instruction, teacher education, and oc-
cupational skills. NASA Press Release No. 75-153 (May 20, 1975); NASA Press Release
No. 76-101 at 2-3 (May 26, 1976).
9. It is now possible to build and launch a satellite with enough power that direct
reception of television is possible using a ground terminal costing not millions of dollars,
as was formerly the case, but five thousand dollars or less. Current research may result
in a further reduction in cost - to a few hundred dollars - in the near future. Hupe,
supra note 7.
10. Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, July 14, 1971, Final Protocol, 23 U.S.T.
1527, 1573.
11. Id. at 1573 n.1.
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small antennae.12 "Community reception," on the other hand, encom-
passes reception of the satellite signals by more complex equipment
which is intended for use by the general public either at one location
or through redistribution covering a limited area.1 3 Current technology
permits individuals reception only through specially designed television
receivers. Existing home receivers must be augmented to receive these
signals. However, the means to permit direct reception of satellite
transmissions by conventional units may soon be developed."1
Thus, broadcasting satellites are essentially of two kinds: those
that can broadcast into an augmented community receiver for service
to that community and those that can broadcast directly into home
receivers. It is the latter type of satellite that most seriously concerns
the countries which are seeking binding principles governing direct
satellite broadcasting. The controversy arises from the fact that satellite
technology will enable broadcasters to beam television programs di-
rectly into slightly modified individual television receivers, eliminating
the necessity of sending the signal through large government-controlled
ground stations in each country.'5
The satellite is seen by many as another step in a kind of informa-
tional imperialism, giving the major developed countries substantial
control over information received by the less developed ones.'0 Some
governments are concerned that information and opinions reaching
their citizens directly will lead to enhanced political opposition. This
view is not peculiar to States of a particular ideology. Some States fear
the impact of Soviet information and propaganda; others fear the threat
of ideas and information from the United States. 7 As Ronald Stowe,
United States delegate to the CPUOS Legal Subcommittee, recognized:
12. Id. at 1574.
13. Id. at 1574 n.I. For a more detailed description of the technical design of a
direct broadcast distribution system and the equipment necessary for direct reception
(including a cost estimate for production in a potential user nation), see Janky, Low-
Cost Receivers and the Use of Direct Broadcast Satellites for Instructional Television,
5 STAN. J. INTL STUD. 138 (1970).
14. B. SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROADCASTING FROM SATELLITES 8 (1976).
15. Statement by Ronald F. Stowe, (Assistant Legal Advisor for United Nations
Affairs, Department of State, to the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications
of the House Committee on Science and Technology), On the Development of Inter-
national Space Law (July 29, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Stowe Statement] at 5 (un-
published statement on file at the JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ENTERTAINMENT
LAw, Hastings College of the Law).
16. De Sola Pool, Direct Broadcasting Satellites and the Integrity of National Cul-
tures 42, 44 (1974) (unpublished paper on file at the JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS
AND ENTERTAINMENT LAw, Hastings College of the Law. An edited version of this
paper appears in 1975 Soc'Y 47 (Sept./Oct).
17. Id. Stowe Statement, supra note 15, at 7-8.
"there are legitimate interests, including our own, that would call for
restrictions.""' Thus, potential political and social effects of direct satil-
lite broadcasts have been the primary motivation for international
discourse.
CONTROL THROUGH TECHNICAL MEANS
It is the official position of the United States delegation at the
CPUOS Legal Subcommittee that, given the present state of technol-
ogy, any additional principles to govern the use of direct broadcasting
satellites are unnecessary.' 9 The delegation regards existing interna-
tional law, particularly the Radio Regulations2o established by the ITU,
as sufficient to govern the use of such systems as they exist today, or
will exist within the foreseeable future.
The United States at first opposed the drafting of such principles
to govern the use of direct broadcasting satellites on the ground that
international action was premature.2 1 Indeed, because of economic and
technological considerations, direct-to-home reception is not likely to
be in operation prior to 1985.22 Furthermore, while several broadcast
satellite services for community reception have been demonstrated,
none of these experiments has involved direct-to-home reception. 23 It
is clear that any legal question involving the use of direct broadcasting
satellites cannot be resolved without consideration of the available
technology. Moreover, a rapid legal solution to the problem of direct
broadcasting from satellites is unnecessary, since technical means to
prevent the receipt of unwanted broadcasts are currently available.
Community receivers could be governmentally supervised or con-
trolled in most, if not all, States.24 These States could regulate the
operation and use of their community receivers internally without in-
terference by other States and, if they felt it necessary, could exclude
unwanted telecasts altogether." For example, not any satellite capable
18. Interview with Ronald Stowe, Assistant Legal Advisor for the United Nations
Department of State, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Stowe
Interview].
19. Stowe Statement, supra note 15.
20. Doyle Interview, supra note 3. He stated: "The radio regulations offer so many
safeguards that there is no need of a prior consent principle."
21. Stowe Statement, supra note 15.
22. Doyle Interview, supra note 3.
23. Interview with Kalmann Schaeffer, Executive Office of the President, Office of
Telecommunications Policy, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 4, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Schaeffer Interview].
24. Doyle Interview, supra note 3.
25. Id.
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of broadcasting into community receivers could broadcast into all
community receivers any place in the world. The satellite and the
ground receiver must be of compatible design. Thus, antennae could
be designed to receive only the frequencies occupied by approved
satellite broadcasting systems. 6 As a further check, local governments
could regulate the use of community receivers once they had been
installed. If a powerful frequency were identical with, or close enough
to, an approved frequency to result in unwanted reception, the gov-
ernment could prevent the operation of community receivers during
periods of objectionable programming. Clandestine receivers picking
up unapproved channels would be unlikely due to the expense and the
obviousness of large antennae.28
Controlling the receipt of undesirable broadcasts would not be a
novelty.29 Japan, after 1933, forbade the possession of shortwave radio
sets and imposed penalties for listening to foreign broadcasts. Nazi
Germany in the 1930's introduced a receiver called the "People's Set"
which was incapable of receiving foreign broadcasts. In the Soviet
Union in 1951, only eighteen percent of the existing radios were cap-
able of direct over-the-air reception; the majority were restricted to
the more easily controlled cable reception.30
On the other hand, broadcast direct-to-home will be more difficult
to control, although several means of limiting reception are currently
available. A government could forbid all home reception by banning
the manufacture, importation, or distribution of home reception an-
tennae or adaptors,31 and could limit the manufacture of home re-
ceivers to only those capable of receiving the one or two government-
approved channels.32
THE EFFECT OF WARC '77
Some commentators have argued that the problem of intentional
radiation of tele-broadcasts from one State to the territory of another
will not arise after the World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC) in 1977.33 In 1973, the Plenipotentiary Conference of the
26. See NASA Facts, NF-53/1-75 (1975).
27. Id.
28. See Chaynes and Chazen, Policy Problems in Direct Broadcasting from Satellites,
5 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 14 (1970).
29. Doyle Interview, supra note 3.
30. See B. Murty, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 55 (1968).
31. Doyle Interview, supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. Memorandum on Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite and the Legal
Norms for Its Use, 26 EBU REVIEW 58 (1975) [hereinafter cited as EBU REVIEW].
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International Telecommunications Union resolved that WARC be con-
vened in Geneva, Switzerland, on January 10, 1977, for the planning
of the broadcasting satellite service in the 11.7-12.2 GHz frequency
band.14 The purpose of WARC '77 is to: (1) establish sharing criteria
for the bands 11.7-12.2 GHz; (2) plan for the use of each band; and,
(3) establish procedures to govern the use of these bands by direct
broadcasting satellites.3 These topics will necessitate consideration of
the technical characteristics of transmissions, the number of television
channels required in the frequency spectrum, the position in the geo-
stationary orbit of the satellite radiating these signals, the shape and
dimension of the beam or beams of the satellite transmitting antennae
(i.e., demarcation of the area served), the direction in which the beam
will be pointed, and coordination and notification procedures.36 Each
country showing a need for the use of direct-broadcasting programs
will be assigned a frequency within the band. Use of those bands will
be permitted under ITU regulations on a non-interference basis.37 A
nation's deliberate attempt to transmit programs into channels already
in use in another country's direct broadcast system would therefore
be ineffective, as the result would be interference rather than clear
reception of any program. Furthermore, such an action would con-
travene the International Telecommunications Convention.38
PART II. UNITED NATIONS ACTIVITIES AND ISSUES
INVOLVED IN DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING
THE UNITED NATIONS' INVOLVEMENT
The United Nations' interest in direct broadcasting satellites de-
veloped from its early concern with international satellite communica-
tions. At its 1968 session, the General Assembly devoted particular
attention to direct broadcasting by satellite when it approved the
establishment of a Working Group on direct-broadcast satellites within
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space .3 However, it
34. 52 F.C.C.2d 1069 (1975).
35. Id. at 1071.
36. Id. at 1073.
37. See Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, July 17, 1971, Final Protocol, 23
U.S.T. 1527.
38. 26 EBU REVIEW, supra note 33, at 61. It should be noted, however, that "it is
certainly possible that during the planning week a State may express its intention of
radiating broadcasts to another State, but in this event it must indicate in detail all the
elements mentioned above, i.e., the country to which it intends to radiate broadcasts
and the characteristics of the broadcasts, for the purpose of inclusion in the plan."
39. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 6, supra note 2, at 3. The Working Group's original man-
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was not until August 1972, when Mr. Gromiko, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Soviet Union, urged the United Nations General As-
sembly to prepare an international convention on principles to govern
the use of direct-satellite broadcasts,4 0 that the United Nations became
directly involved in the regulation of the new technology. A few
months later, the General Assembly called upon its CPUOS "to elabor-
ate principles governing the use by States of artificial air satellites for
direct television broadcasting with a view to conclude an international
agreement or agreements."4' The United States cast the only vote
against the resolution.42
In the following two years, the United States, the Soviet Union,
Canada, Sweden, and Argentina, submitted working papers on prin-
ciples,43 and the Working Group produced a report which covered in
detail the areas of consensus as well as various divergent views. 4 4 In
May 1974, the Legal Subcommittee drafted fourteen principles; con-
sensus was reached on only three of them. At its last meeting in May
1976, the Legal Subcommittee reached nine areas of consensus, drop-
ped two issues, and left three to be resolved. The remaining issues are:
(1) prior consent; (2) program content; and (3) unlawful and inad-
missible broadcasts.4  These three issues have been the most sensi-
tive and most heatedly debated, and a wide divergence among the
different views remains.46
date was "to study and report on the technical feasibility of communication by direct
broadcast from satellites and the current foreseeable developments in this field, including
comparative user costs and other economic considerations, as well as the implications
of such developments in the social, cultural, legal and other areas." McIntyre, U.S.
Cautions Against Premature International Regulation of Developing Direct Broadcast
Satellite Technology, DEP'T. STATE BULL. 197 (July 30, 1973).
40. Request of the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the 25th
Session. 27 U,N, GAOR 1, U.N. Doe. A/8771 (1972) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Doc.
A/8771].
41. G.A. Res. 2916, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30), 14 U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972).
42. The United States wants no international agreement at all, at least at this time.
Some of the reasons given stem from questions concerning national and international
lack of experience with this still undeveloped aspect of space communication, concern
lest future technological development be inhibited, and possible adverse effects on the
free exchange of ideas and information. U.S. Mission Press Release (USUN-13 (72))
(statement by Robert C. Tyson, United States Representative, in Plenary, in explanation
of vote on Direct Broadcast Satellites).
43. 29 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2-5 Annexes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/107 (1974).
44. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 6, supra note 2.
45. Schaeffer Interview, supra note 23.
46. Id.
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION:
Two DIFFERENT APPROACHES
The United States was initially reluctant to enter into negotiations
for the elaboration of principles governing the use of direct broadcast-
ing satellites. It has since modified its position,47 and in 1974 tabled
a paper containing draft principles on direct broadcasting.48 The draft
presented the American view that there should be no express restriction
on the flow of information, either through a code of conduct or in a
prior consent requirement.49 Since then, the United States has softened
its position. In August 1975, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger,
in his statement on international law before the American Bar Associa-
tion meeting in Montreal, suggested that any system of direct television
broadcasting by satellite should be accompanied by full consultation. o
The substance of this proposal was that prior to undertaking direct
television broadcasting, States within the reception area be notified of
the intention to broadcast, and good faith efforts to reconcile problems
be made.5' However, as remarked by Mr. Kalmann Schaeffer, of the
Executive Office of the President in the Office of Tele-communications
Policy, "consultations do not imply an international set of principles
which in effect constitute international censorship. The United States
will never assent to an official principle that states that a prior consent
has to be obtained." 52
On the other hand, the 1972 Soviet Union convention proposed a
regime of strict control with a code of broadcasting conduct and a re-
47. The United States recognized that many members favored guidelines, and re-
alized the needs and national sensitivities of other countries with regard to Direct Tele-
vision Broadcasting by Satellite. Stowe Statement, supra note 15, at 4-5.
48. 29 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 4 Annexes,
U.N. Doe. A/AC. 105/127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CPUOS, Annex 41.
49. While the proposal places no express restrictions on the conduct of international
satellite broadcasting, it states that it "should be carried out in a manner compatible
with the maintenance of international peace and security with a view to enhancing co-
operation, mutual understanding and friendly relations among all states and peoples."
The American declaration then reiterates the American view that international satellite
broadcasting "should . . . be conducted in a manner which will encourage and expand
the free and open exchange of information and ideas," and couples this with an in-
junction to take "into account differences among cultures and maximiz[e] the beneficial
use of new space communications technologies." Id. at art. III-IV.
50. "We are committed to the wider exchange of communication and ideas. But we
recognize that there must be full consultation among the countries directly concerned."
Address by Seceretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, American Bar Association Annual
Convention (Aug. 11, 1975).
51. Statement by Ambassador Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Mission Press Release
(USUN-116 (75)) (Oct. 13, 1975).
52. Schaeffer Interview, supra note 23.
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quirement of the recipient country's prior consent. 3 The .Soviet Union
also proposed that each State promise not to use television broadcast
satellites to endanger the peace, to encroach on fundamental human
rights, to depict violence, horrors, pornography and the use of narcotics,
or to misinform the public.54 Article V of the Soviet proposal would re-
quire that transmission to a foreign State be done "only with the express
consent of the latter." Article VI (1) would make any satellite broad-
cast to a foreign State which has not given the necessary consent an
illegal act allowing the receiving country to "utilize the means at its
disposal" to "conteract" such broadcasting. 5 Those "means" apparently
include jamming signals and actual destruction of broadcast satellites.5o
The Soviet Union has since modified this position,5 7 but the proposed
regime still calls for the consent of the receiving country to broadcast.
After four years of negotiations, no final compromise has yet been
reached within the CPUOS Legal Subcommittee. Following is a pres-
entation of alternative proposals on each of these three issues as
drafted by the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva on May 26, 1976.
(1) PRIOR CONSENT
ALTERNATIVE A
Direct television broadcasting by means of artificial earth satellites
specifically aimed at a foreign State shall require theconsent of that
State. The consenting State shall have the right to participate in
activities which involve coverage of territory under its jurisdiction.
This participation shall be governed by appropriate arrangements
between the States involved."8
This alternative was formulated by the Canadian/Swedish working
paper. 9 The two countries felt that the principle of prior consent is
closely linked with that of participation; the State consenting to the
receipt of broadcasts from another State should be allowed to partici-
53. 29 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2 Annexes,
U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2].
54. U.N. Doc. A/8771, supra note 40, at 4.
55. Id.
56. Laskin & Chayes, International Satellite Controversy, Soc'Y, Sept./Oct. 1975,
at 35.
57. Art. IX of the modified convention provides that in the case of illegal satellite
broadcasts, a State "may take in respect of such broadcasts measures which are recog-
nized as legal under International Law." 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 53, at 3.
58. 30 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2 Annexes,
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/171 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 CPUOS, Annex 21.
59. 29 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 3 Annexes,
art. V-VI, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/127 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CPUOS,
Annex 3].
202 Comm/ENT [Vol. 1
pate in the activities involved in their production.c This position is
consistent with the Soviet proposal.
ALTERNATIVE B
Direct broadcasting by satellite may be subject to such restrictions
imposed by the State carrying out or authorizing it as are compat-
ible with the generally accepted rules of expression, which includes
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers.
The consent of any State in which such broadcasting is received is
not required, but the State carrying it out or authorizing it should
consult fully with any such receiving State which so requests con-
cerning any restrictions to be imposed by the former State.61
This alternative is congruent with the United States' position, call-




The broadcasting of commecial advertising, direct or indirect to
countries other than the country of origin, should be on the basis
of appropriate agreements between the countries concerned.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, States undertaking activities in di-
rect television broadcasting by satellites should in all cases exclude
from the television programmes any material which is detrimental
to the maintenance of international peace and security, which publi-
cizes ideas of war, militarism, national and racial hatred and enmity
between peoples, which is aimed at interfering in the domestic
affairs of other States or which undermines the foundations of the
local civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or language.13
The above reflects the position of the Soviet Union as formulated
in Article IV of its working paper.6 4
ALTERNATIVE B
States or their broadcasting entities which participate in direct
television broadcasting by satellite with other States should co-
operate with one another in respect to programming, programme
content, production and interchange of programmes.61
60. This alternative would be consistent with the Soviet proposal. However, the
Soviet proposal does not mention the concept of participation. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2,
supra note 53, at art. V.
61. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58.
62. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
63. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, at 2.
64. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 53, at art. IV.
65. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, at 4.
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As this proposition calls for consultations and not de facto censor-
ship, it would be consistent with the United States' working paper.66
It is also consistent with Article VIII of the Canadian/Swedish working
paper.
(3) UNLAWFUL/INADMISSIBLE BROADCASTS
States shall regard as unlawful and as giving rise to the interna-
tional liability of States direct television broadcasts specifically
aimed at a foreign State but carried out without the express con-
sent of the latter, containing material which according to these
principles should be excluded from programmes, or received as a
result of unintentional radiation if the broadcasting State has re-
fused to hold appropriate consultations with the State in which the
broadcasts are received.
In case of the transmission to any State of television broadcasts
which are unlawful, that State may take in respect of such broad-
casts measures which are recognized as legal under international
law.
States agree to give every assistance in stopping unlawful direct
television broadcasting by satellite.
Any broadcasts that a State does not wish to be made in its territory
or among its population and in respect of which it has made known
such decision to the broadcasting State are inadmissible.
Every transmitter, State, international organization or authorized
agency shall refrain from making such broadcasts or shall immedi-
ately discontinue such broadcasts if it has begun to transmit them."
These propositions reflect Articles VIII and IX of the Soviet pro-
posal." The United States proposal is silent on the question of illegality.
The following is a review of the nine principles agreed to by the
CPUOS Legal Subcommittee on May 26, 1976.
(1) PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES
This first principle recognizes that direct television broadcasting by
satellite should contribute to the preservation of international peace
and security and to the development of mutual understanding and the
strengthening of friendly ties and cooperation among all States and
all peoples, while fostering economic and social development, promot-
ing cultural exchanges and improving the educational level of all
peoples.co
66. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 53. For a discussion of content regulations
in the United States, see infra Part III.
67. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, at 4-5.
68. 1974 CPUOS, Annex S, supra note 53, at 2-3.
69. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, at 1.
204 [Vol. 1
(2) APPLICABLE LAW
The second principle establishes that existing international law
forms the basis for the conduct of States in the organization of direct
television broadcasting by satellite.7o
(3) RIGHTS AND BENEFITS
It is here recognized that all States have an equal right to conduct
direct television broadcasting by satellite and to enjoy the benefits of
new technology without discrimination of any kind.7 1
(4) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
In view of the fact that at the present time the development of
direct television broadcasting by satellite would be technically and
economically difficult, the United Nations strongly encourages inter-
national cooperation in the development and use of the direct broad-
casting system. 7 2
(5) STATE RESPONSIBILITY
States are made internationally responsible for all direct broadcast-
ing satellite activities which are either carried out by them or under
their jurisdiction.7
(6) DUTY AND RIGHT TO CONSULT
The sixth principle requires that any State requested to do so by
another State enter into consultations with the requesting State about
direct satellite broadcasting activities that are likely to affect the
requesting State.74
(7) PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
This principle calls for consultation or use of established procedures
for the settlement of disputes which may arise from the use of direct
broadcast satellites." Under this principle, jamming would almost
certainly be considered an illegal act.
(8) COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS
Cooperation on a bilateral basis for protection of copyrights and
70. Id., cf. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 53, at 11, para. 34(c) (where the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
were regarded by several delegations as applicable). The new draft of principle, 1976
CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, omits reference to these two instruments.
71. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58, at 2.
72. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 53, at 11-12.
73. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58.
74. Id. at 2.
75. Id. at 3.
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neighboring rights by means of appropriate agreements between the
interested States is prescribed.71
(9) NOTIFICATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
The final principle asks for States conducting or authorizing activ-
ities in connection with direct satellite broadcasting to inform the Sec-
retary General of the United Nations "to the greatest extent possible
of the nature of such activities.""
PART III. THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF DIRECT
BROADCASTING SATELLITES IN LIGHT OF
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The Nature of the Controversy
The eventuality of direct broadcasting by satellite has generated a
confrontation between two ubiquitous concepts in international rela-
tions. The first of these is the principle of the free flow of information
and ideas, the function of which is not only to protect free expression,
but also to protect the right of peoples to receive information and
ideas.78 In the context of the present discussion, this principle would
both prevent censorship of programs broadcast internationally via di-
rect satellites and support a free exchange of information among states.
The second principle is that of national sovereignty, including the
recognition of a right to preserve national identity against foreign
propoganda.79 This concept is intimately connected with the issue of
government control over the free and open exchange of ideas and in-
formations among individuals as well as among States, and in particular
with the question of what extent governments should be able to control
what their people see on television.
The principles of freedom of information and of state power to
control dissemination of information appear incompatible on their face
if strictly construed. However, just as the first amendment right of
freedom of expression can be abrogated to some extent by govern-
mental regulations,So so the international principles of freedom of ex-
pression and of national sovereignty may also be limited. Thus, in a
given international instrument, both of these international principles
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 10 U.N. GAOR, Reso-
lutions (Pt. I) 71, U.N. Doc. A/811, (1948) [hereinafter cited as Declaration] at art. 19.
79. Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, [1966] U.N. Y.B., art. 20, at 46.
80. See text infra Part IV.
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can in fact be reconciled. It would be misleading to regard either as
prevailing over the other.
Should a principle on program content (and particularly on prior
consent) be included in an international agreement on direct broad-
casting by satellite, the healthy equilibrium between freedom of in-
formation and state sovereignty, as recognized by many existing inter-
national instruments, would be destroyed."' The danger of establishing
a precedent which might be applied in other areas is to be feared.
As has been shown, many existing international instruments, some
of which have binding force,82 protect freedom of expression as a
fundamental right, and a provision for censorship in a successive treaty
could, under certain circumstances, either abrogate the free expression
provisions of prior treaties or be held invalid as inconsistent with prior
treaties. Under article 30, paragraph 4(b) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties," a treaty covering the same subject matter as
81. In its Essentials of Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 290, 4 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/1251 (1949), the General Assembly called upon every nation "8) [t]o remove the
barriers which deny to peoples the free exchange of information and ideas essential to
international understanding and peace." Many United States bilateral treaties concerning
trade and commerce contain express provisions relating to freedom of information. For
example, the Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation concluded with Bel-
gium, T.I.A.S. 4797, 14 U.S.T. 1284, 480 U.N.T.S. 149, 153, provides in art. 2, para-
graph 4 that "Nationals of either Party shall be permitted, within the territories of
the other Party, to gather information material for dissemination to the public abroad,
and shall enjoy freedom of transmission of such material to be used for publication by
the press, radio, television, motion pictures and other means; and they shall be permitted
to communicate freely with other persons inside and outside such territories by mail,
telegraph and other means open to general public use." Other such bilateral treaties
containing similar provisions have been concluded by the United States with the follow-
ing States: Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, T.I.A.S. 4797, 12 U.S.T. 908, 910, 421 U.N.T.S. 105,
108; Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, T.I.A.S. 3593, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1842,
273 U.N.T.S. 3, 6; France, Nov. 25, 1959, T.I.A.S. 4625, 11 U.S.T. 2398, 2400, 401
U.N.T.S. 75, 78; Greece, Aug. 3, 1951, T.I.A.S. 3057, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1837-39, 224
U.N.T.S. 279, 302; Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, T.I.A.S. 3853, 8 U.S.T. 899, 902, 284 U.N.T.S.
93, 112; Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, T.I.A.S. 2155, 1 U.S.T. 785, 789, 206 U.N.T.S. 269,
272; Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, T.I.A.S. 2948, 5 U.S.T. 550, 553, 219 U.N.T.S. 237, 254;
Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, T.I.A.S. 2863, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2066, 206 U.N.T.S. 143, 192-94;
Korea, Nov. 28, 1956, T.I.A.S. 3947, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2219-2220, 302 U.N.T.S. 281, 304-
06; Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, T.I.A.S. 5306, 14 U.S.T. 251, 253, 474 U.N.T.S. 376,
378; Netherlands, Mar. 27, 1956, T.I.A.S. 3942, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2046, 285 U.N.T.S. 231,
235; Nicaragua, Jan. 21, 1956, T.I.A.S. 4024, 9 U.S.T. 449, 452, 367 U.N.T.S. 3, 6;
Oman, Dec. 20,1958, T.I.A.S. 4530, 11 U.S.T. 1835, 1837, 380 U.N.T.S. 181, 198;
Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, T.I.A.S. 4683, 12 U.S.T. 110, 112, 404 U.N.T.S. 259, 262;
Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, T.I.A.S. 6193, 18 U.S.T. 1, 3, 680 U.N.T.S. 159, 162; Vietnam,
Apr. 3, 1961, T.I.A.S. 4890, 12 U.S.T. 1703, 1705-06, 424 U.N.T.S, 137,152.
82. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, 150 U.N. Y.B.
on Human Rights 418-26 (1950); The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Ri'ghts, 20 U.N. Y.B. 423-31 (1966).
83. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, opened for
signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, art. 30 at 289 [hereinafter cited
as Vienna Convention].
No. 1] 207
a prior treaty would prevail over the inconsistent terms of the prior
treaty as long as all parties to the prior treaty concluded the successive
treaty. Hence, a prior treaty could be terminated if all the parties
thereto entered into a subsequent and incompatible treaty on the
same subject matter, and expressly provided for such termination.8 4
As applied in our context and assuming the existence of a treaty on
direct broadcasting by satellite which would include a censorship pro-
vision, the above rule implies that as to those States party to both
treaties, the subsequent treaty on direct broadcasting would prevail.
As to a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one, the
treaty to which both states are parties, i.e. the prior treaty protecting
freedom of information, would govern. Given the large number of
States likely to ratify a treaty on direct broadcasting from satellites,85
and given that a great many of these States were party to one of the
binding treaties protecting freedom of information, it is to be expected
that the freedom of information provisions of these prior treaties would
be abrogated by the subsequent consorship provisions." Such a result
is undesirable and it is urged that before entering into international
agreement calling for broadcast censorship, a nation should seriously
consider the consequences of such adherence.
As evidenced by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,88 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
the United Nations,89 major United Nations' recommendations and
resolutions,"o and numerous bilateral treaties or conventions,91 freedom
of information and ideas has for a long time been a matter of concern
in international law and has always been considered a fundamental
right. The following international instruments specifically proclaim the
prevalence of the principle of freedom of information.
2. The Right to Communicate Across Boundaries
(a) The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
84. Id. at art. 59.
85. Stowe Interview, supra note 18.
86. See note 83 supra.
87. U.N. Y.B. on Human Rights 418-26 (1950).
88. 20 U.N. Y.B. 423-31 (1966).
89. Declaration, supra note 78.
90. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, U.N. Doc. A/7164, 2 Annexes
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention on Freedom of Information].
91. See note 82 supra.
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and Fundamental Freedomso2 was signed at Rome on November 4,
1950, by the member States of the Council of Europe. It is particularly
noteworthy in that it entitles "any person, non-governmental organiza-
tion or group of individuals" to lodge complaints with the specifically
established European Commission of Human Rights against any State
party which has recognized the competence of the Commission to
receive such petitions."
Article 10(1) of the Convention recognizes, subject to certain con-
ditions and restrictions which might be necessary in the interests of
national security and public safety, the right to freedom of expression.
This right includes "freedom to hold opinions and to receive and im-
part information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers."9
(b) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"
on a worldwide level, was adopted and opened for signature, ratifica-
tion and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of
December 1966. The Covenant entered into force on March 23, 1976,90
three months after deposit with the Secretary General of the Thirty-
Fifth Instrument of Accession." The Covenant specifically confirmed
the fundamental right of freedom of expression. This right includes
"freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the
form of art, or through any other media of [the expressor's] choice.""
Conditions on the exercise of these rights may be imposed only by law
as necessary
(1) for respect of the rights or reputation of others.
(2) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.99
92. U.N. Y.B. on Human Rights 418-26 (1950).
93. Id., art. 25 (1) at 422.
94. Id. at 421.
95. 20 U.N. Y.B. 423-31 (1966).
96. As of June 15, 1976, 58 States had ratified or acceded to the Covenant: Barbados,
Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritius, Mongolia, Norway, Rumania, Rwanda, Sweden, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrani-
an SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain, Tanzania, Uruguay and
Yugoslavia. In addition, Australia and the Phillipines had ratified the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, bringing the total of the ratiflica-
tions or accessions to that Covenant to 40.
97. - - U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4 Sub., 2/366 (1976).
98. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 20 Y.U.N. 406, 426, art. 19(2), U.N.
Doc. A/6546 (1966).
99. Id., art. 19(3) at 426.
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An optimal protocol'oo to the Covenant which provides individuals
with a right of complaint after exhaustion of available local remedies,
has also entered into force.
(c) A Specific Draft Convention on Freedom of Information has
been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly since its
14th Session in 1968.101 This Draft Convention declares the following
guiding principles:
(1) Each Contracting State undertakes to respect and protect the
rights of every person to have at his or her disposal diverse sources
of information.
(2) Each Contracting State shall secure to its own nationals and
each of the nationals of every other Contracting State as are law-
fully within its territory, freedom to gather, receive and impart
without governmental interference, save as provided in article 2,
and regardless of frontiers, information and opinion orally, in writ-
ing, or in print, in the form of art or by duly licensed visual or
auditory devices .102
Article 2(1) points out that the exercise of these freedoms carries
with it duties and responsibilities. That exercise, however, may be
subject to such necessary restrictions as are clearly defined by law and
applied in accordance with the law in respect to national security and
public order (ordre public ).103
(d) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted on
December 10, 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly.o'0 Article
19 states that
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions . . . and to seek, receive,
100. Id., art. 1, 2, 4(a), 5, at 419.
101. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 90.
102. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, 20, supra note 98, at 426.
103. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 90.
104. Declaration, supra note 78. In general, declarations or resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly are not binding, but in some circumstances they may have
direct legal effect as an authoritative interpretation and application of the principles
of the Charter. It can be contended that the Declaration of Human Rights interprets
the human rights clauses of the United Nations Charter and by virtue of the binding
force of the Charter is binding on all member countries who ratified the Declaration.
Newman, The International Bill of Human Rights: Does it Exist?, in CURRENT PROB-
LEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS ON UNITED NATIONs LAW AND ON THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 112 (1975). See Schwelb, An Instance of Enforcing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights - Action by the Security Council, 22 INT'L & Comp. L.Q.
101 (1973). Under art. 38(1) of the statute of the International Court of Justice (24
U.N. Y.B. 1013), the Declaration may be deemed binding as concerned with general
principles of international law, and acceptance by a majority of votes constitutes evi-
dence of the opinions of governments in the widest forum for the expression of such
opinions. General principles of law may often reflect international customary law and
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and impart informations and ideas through media and regardless
of frontiers.1os
Paragraph 2, in the preamble, and Article 30 are of particular in-
terest. The second paragraph of the preamble welcomes "the advent of
a world in which Human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech . ."1on
Article 2 extends the document's affirmation of basic human rights to
every individual without distinction of any kind."10
Article 30 reinforces the principle of a fundamental right to infor-
mation by concluding that "nothing in the Declaration may be in-
terpreted as implying . . . any right to perform any act aimed at the
destruction of . . . the rights and freedoms set forth herein."10
Article 12 limits this fundamental right to information by protecting
individual rights to privacy and restricting attacks upon reputation. 09
3. Limitations upon the International Right of
Free Expression
As recognized by article 54 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, 01
treaties sometimes specify that, in certain circumstances or under cer-
tain conditions, the operation of a treaty or of some of its provisions
may be suspended. Under such circumstances a party (or parties)
would be excused from the performance of its obligations under the
treaty.
The international instruments discussed in the previous section
as such are binding. The principle of freedom of information is considered to be a fun-
damental right. Except in time of war an international regime of censorship has never
been established. Freedom of information can be considered an international customary
law. See 13 DIG. INT'L L. 1040-68 (1968). It is interesting to note that while the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics refuses to recognize the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights as binding law applicable in the issue of direct broadcasting satellites,
and even though the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not vote for the Declara-
tion, like all member States it has accepted the obligations of the Charter, and in recent
years has also recognized the Declarations' force as a document that intekprets the
Charter. Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations Charter,
5 HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 283, 286 (1972).
105. Declaration, supra note 78.
106. Id. The preamble reads: "Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people."
107. Id., art. 2.
108. Id., art. 30. Art. 30 reads: "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any rights to engage in any activity or to per-
form any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein."
109. Id., art. 12.
110. Vienna Convention, supra note 83, art. 54.
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evidence the existence of provisions governing the suspension of the
freedom of expression clauses under certain circumstances. We now
turn to the definition and scope of application of these restrictive
provisions.
(a) NATIONAL SECURITY
The term "national security" has not been defined by any official
United Nations declaration or commentary. In its 1966 report, the
International Law Commission refused to involve itself in the for-
mulation of a draft article covering the general principles governing
reparations to be made for a breach of a treaty and the grounds which
may be invoked to justify the non-performance of one."'
"Self-defense" has traditionally been admitted in international law
as a ground for exoneration from responsibility.112 Since the adoption
of the United Nations Charter, the right of self-defense has at all times
been recognized as exercisable by the State for its own preservation,
but is subject to conditions in Article 51 of the Charter. This doctrine
covers situations of armed conflict, which must exist before the right
of self-defense may properly be exercised. 18 However, in practice,
self-defense is not limited to so-called "international law in time of
war."114 The existence of a "State of necessity" has sometimes been
linked to self-defense. This is particularly evident in one of the bases
of discussion prepared by the Preparatory Committee of the Confer-
ence for the Codification of International Law (The Hague, 1930)."'
The Committee drafted the following text:
Basis of discussion No. 24.
A state is not responsible for damages caused to a foreigner if it
proves that its act was occasioned by the immediate necessity of
self-defense against a danger with which the foreigner threatened
the state or other persons."'
A compilation of the opinions of various writers"' shows that a defini-
tion of such danger would include the following three criteria:
1. The peril must be one which threatens some vital interest of the
state.
111. Oflicial Documents: United Nations (Reports of the International Law Commis-
sion) 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 262 (1967).
112. See L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 159, 187 (7th ed. 1952).
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
114. Oppenheim, supra note 113.
115. 5 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 128 (1929).
116. Id.
117. GARCIA-AMADOR, SOHN & BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW.OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 35 (1974).
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2. The peril must be "grave and imminent".
3. The state must have been "unable to counter-act the peril by
other means".
According to the above definition, a force majeure or a fundamental
change of circumstances (e.g., where a party to a military and political
alliance involving exchange of military and scientific information has
a radical change of government incompatible with the basis of the
alliance) s would justify the termination of a treaty on grounds of
the maintenance of national security. In the instant context, it could
restrict or suspend freedom of information.
(b) PUBLIC ORDER OR SAFETY
The Documents referring to the need to maintain public order as
a ground for restricting freedom of information are more explicit.
Article 2(1) of the Draft Convention on Freedom of Information'e
refers to public order as the systematic dissemination of false reports
harmful to friendly relations among nations and of expressions inciting
to war or to national, racial, or religious hatred; attacks on founders
of religions; incitement to violence and crime; public health and morals;
the rights, honor and reputation of others and the fair administration
of justice.
These restrictions shall, however, "not be deemed to justify the
imposition by any State of prior censorship on news, comments, and
political opinions."12o
Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights1 2 1 specifies the circumstances under which restrictions on the
rights of freedom of information may be exercised, stating that "any
propoganda for war shall be prohibited by law," and further that "any
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incite-
ment to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited . . .
by law."
These limitations upon the right of freedom of information establish
a general code of content to promote international peace and friendly
relations among States. Apart from the restrictive clauses attached to
the formulation of a right to freedom of expression, the United Na-
118. Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties and Commentaries, 61 AlM. J. INT'L L.
285, 433.
119. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information, supra note 90, at art. 2(1).
120. Id. at art. 2(2).
121. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 98, art. 20 at 46.
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tions,12 2 as well as unaffiliated countries,'12  have passed resolutions
condemning seditious propaganda.
The United Nations Charter acknowledges that principles of na-
tional sovereignty are a significant factoi in any quest for peace and
security in international relations."" It identified the purpose of the
United Nations as "to maintain international peace and security, and
to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to peace."12 5
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 110(II), passed
in 1947, states, "The General Assembly condemns all forms of propa-
ganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or
likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of peace,
or act of aggression."126 In 1950, the General Assembly reaffirmed
Resolution 110(II) and added, in part:
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Declares that such propaganda includes:
(1) Incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression;
(2) Measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with
the outside world, by preventing the Press, radio, and other media
of communication from reporting international events and thus hin-
dering mutual comprehension and understanding among peoples;
(3) Measures tending to silence or distort the activities of the
United Nations in favor of peace or to prevent their peoples from
knowing the views of other States Members.127
These provisions, regulating to some extent the international dis-
122. See U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 13 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008 (1968).
123. See, e.g., id. at 1018. The India-Pakistan Declaration. A distinction is drawn
between broad content control and censorship. With respect to the word "restrictions"
in art. 19, para. 3 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the Secre-
tary General, in his annotations, commented: "the restrictions in para. 3 were not to be
understood as authorizing censorship. There was all the difference in the world, it was
said, between a system of censorship and a reminder to the journalist of his duties and
responsibilities and of the limitations which might be placed upon him in the exercise
of the right to freedom of expression." 10 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item 28 (part
II) Annotations on the text of the draft International Covenants on Human Rights, U.N.
Doe. A/2929, July 1, 1955, at 50.
124. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
125. Id. art. 1.
126. U. S. DEP'T OF STATE, 13 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008 (1968).
127. Id. at 1014. See, e.g., G.A. Res 1236, 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 8) 5, U.N.
Doe. A/3805 (1957) (concerning friendly and peaceful relations among states); G.A.
Res. 1301, 13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 8, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958); G.A. Res.
424, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 44, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) (concerning radio
broadcasts containing attack against other countries).
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semination of information and ideas, reflect the customary international
law requiring that, in time of peace, States prevent official utterances
within their territories which would tend to produce civil violence in
a friendly state. 1 2
The Soviet program content proposal would only evidence inter-
national customary law of information content and the various United
Nations resolutions codifying it. However, acceptance of the Soviet
proposal on prior consent would be tantamount to licensing inter-
national censorship.
PART IV. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
1. First Amendment as a Constraint on the United States
Power to Enter Into International Agreements
Assent by the United States to a set of principles restricting the
content of material transmittable via direct broadcasting satellites and
requiring national consent before a signal could be purposely beamed
at a State would raise grave first amendment issues. Should the Soviet
Union's proposal become incorporated in a treaty, the United States
would be empowered to prevent foreign broadcasters from sending
messages deemed subversive by the United States government to
Americans. The United States would be obligated to screen the out-
going programs of American producers by enforcing the consent stand-
ards of the receiving States. 29 This might be an unconstitutional in-
fringement on American broadcasters' rights of free speech.13 0 Further,
if it were held unconstitutional for the United States government to
screen incoming programs (an infringement of a citizen's "right to
hear"), the government would be forced to acquiesce in receiving
unedited political information and sending only such programs as
would be acceptable to foreign regimes.
Although no treaty has ever been held unconstitutional, it is well
128. Van Dyke, The Responsibility of States for International Propaganda, 34 Am. J.
INT'L L. 58 (1940).
129. Because of the principle that makes a State internationally responsible for broad-
casts originating within its borders (supra note 73 and text accompanying) the United
States may want to screen outgoing broadcasts lest it be internationally responsible for
them.
130. But see Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied 396 U.S.
842 (1969) (The FCC may regulate the content of broadcasts). A full discussion of
the limits on FCC power to regulate program content and hence to screen foreign or
domestic broadcast is beyond the scope of this note. However, that the constitutional
problems involved are serious is beyond dispute.
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established that a treaty is subject to constitutional limitations.s1 This
is true despite the confusion created by Missouri v. Holland in which
the Supreme Court stated that "Acts of Congress are the Supreme law
of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while
treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the
United States."' 3 2 This dictum implies that things may be accomplished
by treaty power that could not constitutionally be achieved by exercise
of congressional power alone.'"s This decision must, however, be read
and limited to the context of the facts involved in the Missouri Birds
case.
The Missouri Birds case was brought by the State of Missouri to
prevent the enforcement of the Migratory Birds Treaty Act of July
3, 1918 on the grounds that the treaty was an unconstitutional inter-
ference with the rights reserved to the States by the 10th amend-
ment.'34 The question raised in this case was whether migratory birds
were a proper subject of negotiation" for a treaty with foreign nations.
The State of Missouri argued that Congress had no authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the subject matter in question, directly
or indirectly. Hence, the issue presented to the court involved the dis-
tribution of federal and state powers and whether such distribution
remained unchanged when dealing with international concerns.13 ,
It should be noted that the Court in this case recognized that a
treaty is subject to constitutional limitations.13' As Justice Holmes
stated in the opinion of the Court:
131. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court has regularly and uniformly rec-
ognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Min-
nesota, 270 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1926); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242-43
(1872); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620-21 (1870); Doe v. Draden,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853). Cf. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
176-80 (1803). "We recognize that executive agreements are involved here but it can-
not be contended that such an agreement rises to greater stature than a treaty." In
Ceofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1889), the Court declared: "The treaty power,
as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which
are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the States."
See generally, Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land
and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
132. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
133. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 273 (1972).
134. Missouri v. Holland, supra note 132.
135. The Court ruled that, under its foreign affairs power, Congress can enact legis-
lation on any subject which deals with, relates to, or affects the relations of the United
States with other nations. The foreign affairs power can support legislation on any matter
of international concern.
136. Missouri v. Holland, supra note 132, at 419.
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Every treaty must be presumed to be made subject to the rightful
powers of the governments concerned, and neither the treaty-
making power alone, nor the treaty-making power' in conjunction
with any or all other departments of the government; can bind the
government to do that which the Constitution forbids.'
That the Constitution binds Congress in its treaty-making power
was forcefully and explicitly stated by Justice Black in Reid v. Co-
vert. 1 3 In this case it was held unconstitutional for dependents of
military personnel overseas to be tried for murder under the court
martial procedures of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, although
such trial had been held in accordance with an agreement between
the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. The court martial pro-
ceedings did not include safeguards to which the defendants would
have been constitutionally entitled had they been tried in the United
States. The government contended that this practice was necessary to
carry out the United States' treaty obligations. The court stated:
The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agree-
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the re-
strains of the Constitution.139 . . . The prohibitions of the constitu-
tion were designed to apply to all branches of the National
Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive or by
the Executive and the Senate combined.140
Thus, Reid v. Covert holds that a treaty, like a statute, must be made
in pursuance of the Constitution to be valid. It would indeed be singu-
lar if, while the Federal Government could not take a particular action
contrary to a constitutional prohibition, it need only conclude a treaty
with a foreign country to be able to exercise the very power forbidden
by the Constitution.
Accordingly, the United States will not be able to adhere to pro-
visions of an international agreement on direct broadcasting satellites
that would be violative of the first amendment. This does not mean,
however, that the mere existence of a provision for prior consent in
an international agreement would violate the first amendment, but
rather that the United States government might not be able to enforce
a provision basing denial of consent to broadcast of a program on that
program's content. Thus, the United States might be unable to enforce
such provisions against her own citizens and could not censor the inflow
137. Id.




of information received or the outflow of information desired to be
broadcast abroad.
2. Federal Communications Commission's Authority:
An Analogy
a. PROGRAM CONTENT
It has been established in the previous section that constitutional
constraints bind equally acts of Congress and treaties. Hence, the same
constitutional standard will be applied in determining the constitution-
ality of a statute and that of a treaty. Our attention now turns to the
scope of the standards under which domestic, as well as international
broadcasting can be regulated without infringing upon the first amend-
ment right of free speech. Our ultimate concern is to arrive at the
formulation of a constitutional standard that may be applied to test
the validity of a treaty on direct broadcasting from satellites.
The existing domestic standard is broadly based on statutory regu-
lations. To the extent that the courts have held these statutes to be
constitutional, they aid in determining what international limits on
freedom of information could be contained in a treaty to which the
United States is a party. However, it would be argued that as the
statutory agency established by Congress to regulate broadcasting, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has not exercised its
regulatory authority - and hence the authority of Congress - to the
fullest extent possible under the first amendment.
It has been settled from the beginning that, even though broad-
casting is protected by the first amendment, such protection does not
guarantee an unfettered right of expression. Congress may limit access
to radio waves through licensing in the public interest, 14 and statutory
authority has given the FCC the power to restrict and control some
aspects of program content.14 2
Radio and television affect the public interest in the fair interpreta-
tion of information and the protection of morals;" thus, some govern-
mental examination of program content has long been accepted by the
Supreme Court as part of the regulatory process. 1" The authority of
the Federal Communications Commission to regulate program content
derives primarily from the Commission's broad mandate to allocate
141. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
143. See Surgeon General's Report by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Television
and Social Behavior. Hearings 92d Cong. 2d Sess. Washington, U.S. Government Print.
Off. 1972.
144. See Note, The Freedom of Radio Speech, 46 HARv. L. REv. 987, 993 (1933).
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frequencies on the basis of the "public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity."145 The most conspicuous use of this power relates to specific
programs in the field of political and controversial programming. The
Commission's regulations in this area center around the Equal Time
requirement of the Communications Act and the Fairness Doctrine."
(1) Equal Time: Section 315147 of the Communications Act requires
that a licensee permitting one candidate to broadcast must "afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office." The
statute provides also that the licensee shall not censor any such political
material. 14 The Equal Time provision is the most obvious example
of Congress' willingness to restrict the broadcaster's autonomy in the
interest of some higher public good, in this case the promotion of
fair debate over the air as a part of the American political process.
The Supreme Court found in section 315'1s a congressional intent to
encourage the broadcast media's "broadest possible utilization."1 'o
(2) The Fairness Doctrine: As interpreted by the Commission and
affirmed by the Supreme Court,'51 the Fairness Doctrine requires a
station licensee to give adequate coverage of important public issues
and to provide a fair coverage that accurately reflects opposing views.
Further, under its public interest standard, a licensee is required
affirmatively to seek out controversial issues, which must then be
presented fairly.152
The Commission also exerts enormous control through the initial
grant of broadcasting licenses and the comparative hearing process.
Even if only one applicant for a particular frequency has satisfied the
minimum technical requirements, the Federal Communications Com-
mission may refuse to grant him a license if it finds his program pro-
posals unsatisfactory. 5 3 When there is more than one applicant for
an open channel, the Commission conducts a comparative hearing to
evaluate the relative merits of the various extensive proposals sub-
mitted to it.154 While the FCC gives detailed consideration to other
matters as well,', the comparison of program proposals can be con-
145. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (SuPP. V 1975).
146. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 141.
147. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (Surp. V 1975).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959).
151. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 141.
152. Rollins Broadcasting Inc., 34 F.C.C. 1, 81-82 (1963).
153. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
154. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (Supp. V 1975).
155. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1969).
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sidered the essence of the comparative hearing, since the Commission
will determine on the basis of competitive presentations which poten-
tial licensee is more likely to serve the public interest.'" Accordingly,
license applicants are asked to submit proposals showing the percent-
age of planned programming in the various categories.'5 7 The standard
of balnce is a flexible one, but it is evident that certain program
classifications are looked upon with more approval than others.'"*
In addition, the Communications Act permits the Federal Com-
munications Commission to "prescribe the nature of the service to be
rendered by each class of licensed station,"" !' and to limit transmissions
accordingly. The Act also forbids the broadcasting of "any obscene,
indecent, or profane language,"'oo and although this provision is now
part of the Criminal Code,"' the Federal Communications Commission
has continued to apply it in license preceedings.'02 The Congressional
prohibitions against broadcasting lotteries'"" and gambling informa-
tion'" have been amplified by rules promulgated by the Federal
Communications Commission." 5
It is now well settled that Congressional interference in citizens'
freedom to broadcast is constitutional."" However, in the name of
public interest, Congress could consistently with the first amendment
exercise more extensive control over broadcasting. For example, as
suggested by the Court in Red Lion,'"7 the Congress might legitimately
elect to operate broadcasting as a governmental enterprise; or Congress
could give broadcasting the character of public ownership, or of a
public utility and a common carrier.' Congress could also decide that
156. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
157. Id.
158. In evaluating a program proposal for a license, the FCC will consider as a strong
criteria a balanced programming - i.e., amount of time spent on local self-expression,
local talent, children's programs, and service to minority groups. See, e.g., Middle Ten-
nessee Enterprises, Inc., 1 F.C.C.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1965); Triangle Publications, Inc.,
28 F.C.C.2d 80, 85 (1971).
159. 47 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Sup. V 1975).
160. 47 U.S.C. § 303(m)(1)(D) (Supp. V 1975) authorizes the Commission to sus-
pend the license of any operator upon proof that the licensee: "has transmitted .
communications containing profane or obscene words, language, or meaning.....
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970).
162. See, e.g., Warren J. Currence, 34 F.C.C. 761 (1963).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970).
165. 1 RAD. REG. 55 (1961).
166. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, supra note 141.
167. Id.
168. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
220 [Vol. I
broadcasting stations should be "open mikes" and that "each citizen
in the community should have an opportunity, in rotation, to appear
on the radio or television to share his ideas with his fellow citizens."'
In considering the constitutionality of a regulation, it is important
to distinguish governmental action which assures access of the public
to information and ideas from governmental action which deprives the
public of access to information. To be sure, the purpose of the first
amendment is to assure the free flow of ideas and enlightenment.""
In Associated Press v. United States,'" the purpose of the first amend-
ment was characterized as providing for "the widest possible dissemina-
tion of information from diverse and antagonistic sources." Hence,
whatever form of regulation a governmental action might take, it
would be consistent with the first amendment as long as such regulation
assured free expression in furtherance of the over-all public interest.' 2
The above-formulated standard could be considered a standard
for broadcasting applicable both domestically and internationally.
Thus, in its negotiations for a treaty over direct broadcasting from
satellites, the United States delegation could assent to any form of
regulation over program content as long as such regulation fosters the
American public interest, i.e., the constitutionally protected interest
in robust discussion of public affairs. International implications en-
tailed by these regulations have to be considered in the making of
this treaty, but the United States could constitutionally adhere to the
Soviet draft proposal restricting broadcasted programs whose content
"endangers the peace" or encroaches on "fundamental human rights."
Such a restriction must be distinguished from the restriction of in-
formation that might stir dissatisfaction or dissent, or conflict with
national policy or the international order.
b. PRIOR CONSENT-PRIoR RESTRAINT
As we have seen, the United States Constitution permits some con-
trol over the program content of a broadcast if such control is in the
public interest. On the other hand, the Constitution provides for a
very rigid standard when dealing with prior restraint regulations.
Prior restriant is an official restriction imposed in advance upon
a communication, as distinct from a subsequent punishment for com-
munication made in violation of a law forbidding that type of com-
169. Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting, 37
CIN. L. REV. 512 (1968).
170. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1944).
171. Id.
172. NBC v. United States supra note 156.
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munication.17 1 Prior restraint relates to the method of limitation, not
just to its substance.' 7 4 In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,1"5 the
Court reiterated its position that first amendment guarantees afford
special protection against orders prohibiting the publication or broad-
cast of particular information or commentary - orders that impose a
prior" restraint on speech.
In this case, the court discussed and accepted the Near17" and Pen-
tagon Papers17 cases' condemnation of prior restraint as presumptively
unconstitutional. The government thus carries a heavy burden of show-
ing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. The Court in
Near stated that there are two narrowly-defined exceptions to the pro-
hibition against prior restraint: 1) obscene material, and 2) national
security.1 78
Obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press,
but it is presumed that for the most part the material broadcast to the
United States will not be obscene. The only question then, is whether
programs received from abroad via direct-broadcast satellite, as well
as United States programs intended for broadcast abroad, may be
enjoined because of an overwhelming national interest.
The Pentagon Papers case deals primarily with the issue of national
security, and the three concurring opinions expressly limit the invoca-
tion of the doctrine to situations where "disclosure . . . will surely
result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to the nation or
its people."17" This case, as well as previous Supreme Court cases, in-
dicates that in an extremely narrow class of cases the first amendment's
ban on prior judicial restraint may be overridden.8 0 War and fear of
war as well as protection against "incitements to acts of violence and
the overthrow by force of orderly governments" have been held ade-
quate justification for departures from the constraints of the first
amendment. In the Pentagon Papers case, the concurring opinion of
Justice Brennan appears to indicate that a situation less extreme than
war could justify a prior restraint. Justice Brennan states that even in
173. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
174. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 648
(1955).
175. 424 U.S. 906 (1976).
176. Near v. Minnesota, supra note 173.
177. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). [hereinafter cited
as Pentagon Papers case].
178. Near v. Minnesota, supra note 173.
179. Pentagon Papers case, supra note 177, at 730. (Stewart, J., concurring).
180. Near v. Minnesota, supra note 173; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919).
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peacetime the suppression of information would be constitutional if
such suppression would prevent the "set[ting] in motion of a nuclear
holocaust."s' Whether it is the fear of war or the setting "in motion of
a nuclear holocaust," it is clear that, as evidenced by the Pentagon
Papers case, the burden of overcoming the presumptive unconstitution-
ality of prior restraints is still formidable.
The Pentagon Papers case was brought by the United States to
enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing
a classified study entitled "History of United States Decision-Making
Process on Viet Nam Policy" on the grounds that publication posed a
threat to the national interest.'*- The Court held that there could be
no prior restraint on publication, although a majority of the court be-
lieved that the release of the surreptitiously-obtained (classified "Top
Secret-Sensitive") documents would be harmful to the Nation and that
their publication could be violative of various espionage statutes.183
Thus, from the position taken by the Supreme Court, it is evident
that the United States would not be able to assent to a principle of
prior consent without violating the first amendment, unless it could
prove that free reception of foreign broadcast or free transmission of
American broadcasters would "surely result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to the nation" or to the international order.
The United States today is not so dismantled politically or socially
that the reception of foreign broadcasts (even political propoganda)
would so disrupt order as to inevitably provoke the United States to
initiate a war or a nuclear holocaust. Likewise, the international order
does not appear at this moment to be so fragile that the free dissemina-
tion of ideas would probably result in direct, immediate and irreparable
damage to the international community. In view of the absence or a
present emergency situation, the establishment of a prior restraint
could not be justified.
The 1976 draft on direct broadcasting from satellites, as formulated
by the Legal Subcommittee,"' would make the United States respon-
sible for the material broadcast under its jurisdiction. It is reasonable
to assume, then, that the United States would want to take certain
precautions to avoid the broadcast of materials that would create in-
ternational dissent and unrest. Thus, even if censorship of programs
broadcast abroad cannot be affected, the United States could, as we
181. Pentagon Papers case, supra note 177, at 726.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Supra note 58, and text accompanying.
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have seen, exercise some control over the nature of broadcasts directed
to another country. This control could be exercised through the im-
position of a licensing requirement. Congress could grant licenses
on the basis of respect for international good-will and understanding,
with the power to suspend or revoke the licenses should a licensee fail
to observe the standard.
Conclusion
With respect to the international legal aspects of the television
broadcasting satellite service, the proposals that have been put for-
ward are unnecessary at this time. The need is not so much for new,
special rules banning satellite propaganda as it is for more effective
application of the existing rules. However, that the United States has
involved itself in the elaboration of these principles is a fait accompli.
Under these circumstances, the United States should continue to take
a strong stance in the defense of freedom of expression.
The first amendment allows some leeway in connection with regu-
lation of radio and television, and the United States representatives at
the Legal Subcommittee would not be acting beyond their constitu-
tional mandate in agreeing to certain restrictions on the content of
international direct broadcast from satellites. However, certain con-
cessions already made seem to indicate that the United States delega-
tion is willing to compromise more than it should.
In its fifth session, the Working Group was of the view that the
principle of free flow of information, as embodied in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as well as other documents, was rele-
vant to the conduct of activities in the field of direct television broad-
casting by satellite."' However, the present draft of principles, as
formulated in May 1976,187 fails to recognize the principle of freedom
of information as applicable to an agreement on direct television broad-
casting by satellite, and refers only to the principle of national sov-
ereignty as embodied in various international agreements.1 88
This failure to do justice to so fundamental a concept of interna-
tional law as freedom of expression and of information is a fault that
must be corrected. The United States delegation at the CPUOS Legal
Subcommittee should bring the issue back to the floor of debate at its
185. Price, The First Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite, 23 UCLA
L. REV. 879 (1976).
186. 1974 CPUOS, Annex 6, supra note 2.
187. 1976 CPUOS, Annex 2, supra note 58.
188. Id.
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next meeting. Indeed, it is important to consider that since enforcement
procedures are few, international law depends very much upon respect
for the law and the goodwill between States. Good international law
makes for good adherence to the international law.
Whatever final provisions might be concluded, it must be recog-
nized that adherence to an international principle of censorship could
violate the United States Constitution as well as establish an unwanted
precedent in the international right of freedom of information. The
United States, both as an impartial observer of its own laws and as a
supporter of a strong peaceful system of international order, should
not sanction the imposition of international censorship.

